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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the elasticity of demand for cellular phone network access and the network effects in Malaysia. 
It uses quarterly data from 2003Q1 to 2011Q4 with 7 difference variables in two separate equations. The dependent 
variable is the penetration rate of cellular phone. From the analysis, we found that the penetration rates of cellular 
phone are strongly related to the factors highlighted in the study and all the variables are strongly significant. The 
F-test also suggested that the entity Fixed Effects Model (FEM) is the appropriate model and more preferred for this 
study. From the entity FEM analysis, all independent variables are significant. The price elasticity of demand, cross-
price elasticity and income elasticity are elastic. The result also shows that the fixed-line is complementary and luxury 
goods to the cellular phone network in Malaysia and the networks externalities are strongly significant when we used 
number of subscriber as a proxy. 
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ABSTRAK
Kajian ini menganalisis keanjalan permintaan untuk akses dan kesan rangkaian telefon selular di Malaysia. Kajian 
ini menggunakan data suku tahunan 2003Q1 hingga 2011Q4 dengan mengemukakan 7 pemboleh ubah dalam dua 
persamaan yang berasingan. Pemboleh ubah bersandar ialah kadar penembusan bagi telefon selular. Daripada kajian, 
didapati kadar penembusan telefon selular berkait secara rapat dengan faktor-faktor yang dikaji dan semua pemboleh 
ubah adalah sangat signifikan. Keputusan ujian F juga mencadangkan bahawa entiti Model Kesan Tetap (FEM) 
adalah model yang sesuai and lebih baik untuk kajian ini. Daripada analisis entiti FEM, semua pemboleh ubah adalah 
signifikan. Keanjalan harga permintaan, keanjalan harga silang dan keanjalan pendapatan adalah anjal. Keputusan 
juga menunjukkan bahawa talian tetap merupakan barang penggenap dan barang mewah kepada rangkaian telefon 
selular di Malaysia dan kesan luaran rangkaian adalah amat signifikan apabila menggunakan jumlah langganan 
sebagai proksi. 
Kata kunci: Permintaan; keanjalan; rangkaian; data panel
INTRODUCTION
An increase in access and usage of cellular phones over 
the years has made cellular phones one of the necessities 
in our daily lives. Because of its benefits people and 
people tend to have more than two numbers though they 
have no access to fixed-line. People also tend to access 
and use prepaid lines rather than postpaid network. 
Therefore, this study tries to identify the determinants that 
influence the demand of cellular phone network access 
for postpaid and prepaid market and the elasticity of the 
cellular phone network access in Malaysia. The elasticity 
of demand plays an important role in determining the 
use of mobile and fixed-line phone in Malaysia. It also 
enhances the growth of the telecommunications sector 
as well as controls the oligopoly power that exists in 
the telecommunications market to avoid the existence 
of future collusive behavior. The elasticity of demand 
also regulates the price and allocates of common costs 
(Afridi, Farooq, Ullah & Rahmani 2010; Dewenter & 
Haucap,2007; Karacuka, Haucap & Heimeshoff 2011). 
Several studies have been done in developed countries but 
less implemented in Southeast Asian including Malaysia. 
This study seek to measure the external effects on the 
cellular phone access by using number of subscriber and 
waiting list for fixed-line. 
For the first time ever in the year 2000, the number 
of cellular phone service network subscription was more 
than the fixed-line network subscriptions in Malaysia. In 
the fourth quarter of 2008, the number of cellular phone 
service network subscription was equal to the Malaysian 
population (28 million). Of the average, every Malaysian 
had access to cellular phone service networks and most 
people do have more than two numbers for different 
network services provider but don’t necessarily have any 
access to the fixed-line network. A total subscription for 
cellular phone service is expected to be on the increase, 
while total fixed-line subscription is expected to remain 
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relatively flat. Besides, the number of subscribers that 
use prepaid cellular phone network is greater than those 
that postpaid services. In the third quarter of 2011 for 
example, the number of prepaid subscription service 
network was 28.77 million compared to 6.93 million 
subscribers for postpaid services. The increasing trend of 
network services for prepaid is higher than the postpaid 
because the plans being offered are more attractive and 
the characteristics of telecommunication products that can 
compete with the fixed-line services such as data service 
offers and the existence of smart phones in the Malaysian 
market. The advancement in telecommunication will 
reduce the transaction cost by improving the quality 
of service in communication and directly enhance the 
level of productivity and efficiency of other sector of the 
economy (Brempong & Karikari 2007).
Statistically, the mobile telecommunication networks 
sector in Malaysia is dominated by Maxis, Celcom and 
Digi. Thus, in this study, we used the Average Revenue 
per User (ARPU) for postpaid, prepaid and fixed-line 
as a proxy for price. The ARPU is one of the important 
indicators of market share price for investors who 
wish to invest in the telecommunications sector and 
also used to compare the efficiency and profitability of 
the telecommunications firm. A part from that, rising 
standards of living and economic growth also reflect 
the availability of telecommunication services, in which 
the cellular phone is seen as a necessity in daily life. 
Studies in developed countries shows that the cellular 
phone service is one of the complementary goods while 
in developing countries, cellular phones are classified as 
substitutes to fixed-line (Banerjee & Ros 2004; Vogelsang 
2010). Therefore, this study will evaluate whether 
the cellular phones are substitutes or complementary 
goods; normal, necessity or luxury goods in Malaysia 
by measuring the price elasticity, income elasticity and 
cross-price elasticity of cellular phone network access 
in Malaysia. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Based on theory of telecommunication demand, most 
of the studies used price of calls as one of the important 
variable and measure the price elasticity (Lee & Lee 
2006). But the way researcher defined the price of calls 
as a variable is different from one researcher to another. 
For example, Garbacz and Thompson (2002) used a 
price of monthly usage (Ahn & Lee 1999; Garbacz 
&Thompson 2007; Iimi 2005;) or monthly charge (Ahn 
& Lee 1999; Brempong & Karikari 2007; Madden & 
Neal 2004) a price of installation or connection fee 
(Doganoglu & Grzybowski 2007; Garbacz &Thompson 
2007; Rodriguez-Andrés & Pérez-Amaral 1998; Sung & 
Lee 2002) and price of long distance as a proxy to price 
of calls. Other than that, Dewenter and Haucap (2007) 
used average call price, and the study by Wang, Tang and 
Pan (2010) used three different prices, namely price of 
mobile services, communication tool and local fixed voice 
in China. Meanwhile, Briglauer, Schwarz and Zulehner 
(2009) preferred to used average revenue per user (ARPU) 
as a proxy and real average revenue per minute or ARPM 
(Afridi, et al. 2010). 
A study by Garbacz and Thompson (2002) found 
that price has little effect or no effect and it’s inelastic 
(Banerjee & Ros 2004; Doganoglu & Grzybowski 
2007). The result is quite similar to the results of the 
research done by Iimi (2005) where price does not have 
much significant impact though the elasticity of price is 
high (Garbacz & Thompson 2007). In Korean markets, 
the price elasticity is approaching unit elastic at a pre-
competition, and inelastic at the post-competition (Lee & 
Lee 2006). Besides, pricing of services are not effective 
enough and not competitive because the service operators 
can enter and exit freely to provide services cheaply, 
hence market prices for cellular phone services are 
determined by the governmental regulations in Korean 
market (Lee & Lee 2006). According to Garbacz and 
Thompson (2002), if the price is determined by the 
authorities, there is no close substitute for telephone 
service, and the quantity of demand for telephone service 
is determined by household income, the price of direct 
services and subscriber characteristics.
For demand of usage, a study by Dewenter and 
Haucap (2007) in Austria and Afridi et al. (2010) in 
United Kingdom found out that in the short-term and 
long-term, the price elasticity of demand for access is not 
elastic, where the postpaid market is more elastic than 
prepaid market. But some studies in Turkey indicates 
that the price elasticity of postpaid market is lower than 
prepaid market in the short-term, while in the long run, 
there is no significant difference on the elasticity between 
the short-term and long-term (Karacuka, Haucap & 
Heimeshoff 2011). According to Karacuka, Haucap and 
Heimeshoff (2011), the price elasticity mobile traffic 
as a proxy for price of calls is negative where the price 
elasticity for prepaid users is lower than aggregate 
market. For postpaid market, the price elasticity is lower 
than aggregate market and prepaid because the major 
subscribers for postpaid market are those involved in the 
business. From demand of access perspective, the price 
elasticity is high and thus, there is a long run elasticity of 
demand for telephone lines in Spain (Rodriguez-Andrés 
& Pérez-Amaral 1998). However, Briglauer, Schwarz 
and Zulehner (2009) found that in the long run, the price 
elasticity of the demand for call is elastic but not elastic 
for a short-term in Austria. On the other hand, studies by 
Ahn and Lee (1999) found that the effects of price are 
not so significant revealing the price effect on demand 
for access to mobile phone networks as well as showing 
the price elasticity is inelastic (Madden & Neal 2004; 
Sung & Lee 2002).
The income elasticity less than one or inelastic and 
shows cellular phone services as a normal goods with a 
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positive sign of relationship (Afridi, et al. 2010; Wang, 
Tang & Pan 2010;). Kwak and Lee (2011) found that 
the income effect is very minimal, and cellular phone 
services is considered as luxury goods for the public 
in Korean market (Lee & Lee 2006). Meanwhile, 
the income elasticity in developing countries is high 
based on Garbacz and Thompson (2007) study. Next, 
the external effects have played a small role and have 
a positive relationship with the demand for cellular 
phones (Banerjee & Ros 2004; Iimi 2005), and the size 
of network has a significant impact on the demand for 
calls (Lee & Lee, 2006). Besides, the size of cellular 
network has an impact to expanding the network 
subscription and cause the growth in fixed-line networks 
and cellular networks (Brempong & Karikari 2007; 
Madden & Neal 2004). The subscribers tend to switch 
carriers because of the negative external effects such 
as low quality service and the existent of substitution 
effect (Kwak & Lee 2011). According to Banerjee 
and Ros (2004), the external effects or those who had 
bad experience with fixed-line network will change to 
cellular phones.
METHODOLOGY
The theory of telecommunication demands was presented 
and developed by Taylor (1994). According to the theory, 
to create demand for the telephone, we need to distinguish 
the types of demand in telecommunication. There are two 
types of demands that need to be known and distinguished 
in telecommunication demands, which is the demand for 
access and demand for usage to network. Demand for 
access to network only involves one party, while demand 
for usage involves two parties. The demand function 
for use is derived from individual demand functions for 
calls where:
Q = Q(π, p, r, N, Y)  (1)
where Q is the total number of calls; π is the price of 
calls; p is the price of other goods and services; r is the 
cost of access; N is the number of subscribers; and Y 
is aggregate income. The difference between demand 
function for use and that for access is that the demand 
function for access takes into account the number of 
population in determining the demand for access to 
telephone service network (Taylor, 1994):
N––
M
 = Φ(π, p, r, N, Y, R)   (2)
where M is the size of population and R is a dummy 
variable whether to make calls or not to make calls. 
The price of calls and cost of access have a negative 
relationship with the total number of calls. While, 
aggregate income has a positive relationship with the 
dependent variables. The prices of other goods and 
services as well as number of subscribers have direct 
relationship with the dependent variable. The models 
for aggregate demand function of the cellular phone 
network access designed based on equation (1) and (2) 
are as follows:
N––
M
 = f (π, p, r, N, Y)   (3)
The model in equation (3) has been improved 
by using cellular phone penetration rate (PR) as the 
dependent variable and the average revenue per user 
(ARPU) for postpaid and prepaid market as a proxy for 
the price of calls, cost of access and price of other goods 
and services as the dependent variables. The GDP per 
capita was used to measure the average income level. 
To measure the external effects, this study will used 
the number of subscribers (N) and waiting list (WL) for 
a fixed-line as a proxy and as two separates model to 
examine the degree of significance and to avoid serial 
correlation problem. This study focuses on elasticity of 
demand for network access, and thus, the R variable in 
equation (2) is not relevant for this study. To make a call 
or not to make a calls only happen once the subscribers 
have an access to cellular phone network. Therefore, the 
model equations to be estimated is as follows:
PRCP = β0 + β1ARPUCPPOST + β2ARPUCPPRE + 
β3ARPUFL + β4NFL + β6GDP + ε (4)
PRCP = β0 + β1ARPUCPPOST + β2ARPUCPPRE + 
β3ARPUFL + β5WLFL + β6GDP + ε (5)
where:
PRCP  = penetration rate for cellular phone 
(percentage)
ARPUCPPOST = average revenue per user for cellular 
phone for postpaid market (RM)
ARPUCPPRE = average revenue per user for cellular 
phone for prepaid market (RM)
ARPUFL  = average revenue per user for fixed-line 
(RM) 
NFL = number of subscribers for fixed-line 
(volume)
WLFL = waiting list for fixed-line (volume)
GDP = gross domestic product per capita (RM)
This study used quarterly data from the year of 
2003 to 2011. Three entities or major network providers 
for cellular phone service are involved in this study, 
namely Maxis, Celcom and Digi. To obtain the cross-
price elasticity and the external effects, the comparison 
will be done on the fixed-line network provider, which 
is Telekom Malaysia. Therefore, the panel data in this 
study is a short panel and narrow data. This survey 
data are derived from the quarterly reports and annual 
reports of firms such as Maxis, Celcom, Digi, Telekom 
Malaysia, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia 
Commission (MCMC), Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE), Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) and the economic 
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report. All the data will be deflated with the CPI. This 
study uses panel data by adapting balanced panel data 
where the number of observations is the same for all 
units. In this study we run the pooled OLS and FEM, and 
apply the semi-log functional form in the model equations 
(4) and (5), since the estimated coefficients are referring 
to elasticity. The regressand is in percentage value 
(penetration rate). Therefore, the slope of coefficient is 
refers to elasticity.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
From the Table 1, the central tendency of the variables 
are positive with PR and NFL having the highest and 
lowest mean, respectively. PR and NFFL also have the 
highest and lowest median, respectively. From the table, 
the PR has the larger dispersion or spread while NFL 
has the lowest. The skewness denotes the existence of 
both positive and negative skewed in the variables. The 
positive-skewness indicate that the observed value of 
the variable have a long-tail to the right, large values 
or positively skewed distribution, while negative-
skewed distribution indicate that the side of tail is 
to the left and they are non-symmetric. The Kurtosis 
or the distribution is peaked (leptokurtic) relative to 
the normal for ARPUCPPRE, NFL and WL. The remaining 
variable distribution is platykurtic relative to the normal 
such as PR, ARPUCPPOST, ARPUFL and GDP. The panel unit 
root analysis also indicates that all the variables are 
strongly significant and stationary at first difference 
and integrated of order one, I(1) for common unit root 
as well as individual unit root process.
To select an appropriate model between the pooled 
OLS regression and entity FEM, we use a partial F-test. 
For model 1, the F-value is 217.46 bigger than 99.5, 
the value of F1%,2,100 as well as the F-value for model 
2 is 222.29 bigger than value of F1%,2,100. Therefore, 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there 
are differences in individual intercepts or individual 
fixed effects and the data should not be pooled into a 
single model with common intercept parameters. The 
coefficient estimates generated by using the pooled OLS 
regression is biased and inconsistent. Therefore, the 
entities FEM for both models are preferred and more 
appropriate.
Next, Table 3 show the entity FEM results. For entity 
FEM, we use Ni dummies without intercept to reduce the 
consuming a lot of degree of freedom and probability 
of multicollinearity. The model developed for this 
study is Ni dummies without intercept. Based on entity 
FEM, the coefficient of determination in this regression, 
R2 = 0.9592 or 95.9 per cent for model 1 and R2 = 0.958 
or 95.8 per cent for model 2. The result indicate that the 
variation of dependent variable can be explained by, 
ARPUCPPOST, ARPUCPPRE, ARPUFL, GDP per capita as well 
as NFL for model 1 and WLFL for model 2. It means the 
estimated regression equation is fit to the sample data. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is moderate, 0.9644 and 
0.8720 for model 1 and 2 respectively. Through the FEM, 
each entity has its own intercept. The intercept for Maxis, 
Celcom and Digi are different for each other by using 
differential intercept dummy. The intercept for Maxis or 
D1 is –25.5 and –88.4; –31.2 and –94.5 for Celcom or 
D2; and –37.7 and 101.0 for Digi or D3 in model 1 and 
2 respectively. 
THE DETERMINANTS
From the analysis, the ARPUCPPOST and ARPUCPPRE are 
negatively related to cellular phone PR and significant 
(Afridi, et al. 2010; Karacuka, Haucap & Heimeshoff 
2011). We also found that the ARPUCPFL is negatively 
related to cellular phone PR and significant (Garbacz 
& Thompson 2007; Wang, Tang & Pan 2010; Ahn 
& Lee 1999). Meanwhile, the NFL has an effect and 
negatively related to cellular phone PR (Madden & 
Neal 2004; Lee & Lee 2006; Doganoglu & Grzybowski 
2007). In contrast, the WLFL is positively related to 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics
PR ln ARPUCPPOST ln ARPUCPPRE ln ARFLFL ln GDP ln NFL ln WLFL
Mean 27.245 4.6582 3.7871 3.9411 8.5574 1.4801 3.5418
Median 26.495 4.6333 3.8176 4.1062 8.5858 1.4738 3.6636
Maximum 47.120 5.2164 4.1844 4.4816 8.9221 1.5369 4.1589
Minimum 6.9900 4.2792 0.9711 3.3823 8.1912 1.3938 2.5649
Std. Dev. 10.077 0.2369 0.3226 0.3894 0.2074 0.0261 0.3794
Skewness -0.0149 0.5305 -6.1814 -0.1508 -0.0609 -0.2151 -1.1295
Kurtosis 2.2479 2.3708 54.975 1.3377 2.0606 5.0719 3.3999
TABLE 2. The F-value Results for Pooled OLS vs FEM
Model Model 1 Model 2
R2FEM 0.959238 0.957952
R2POOL 0.781958 0.771014
F-value 217.46 222.29
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the cellular phone PR (Banerjee & Ros 2004; Iimi 
2005; Brempong & Karikari 2007). Lastly, the GDP is 
positively related to cellular phone PR and significant 
(Ahn & Lee 1999; Sung & Lee 2002; Brempong & 
Karikari 2007; Chabossou et al. 2008; Wang, Tang & 
Pan 2010; Afridi et al., 2010). 
THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND
The results showed that the regression coefficient or 
the elasticity of ARPUCPPOST is –4.08 for model 1 and 
–6.41 for model 2. Meanwhile, the ARPU for prepaid 
is significant at 1 per cent for both models. The results 
showed that the elasticity of ARPUCPPRE is elastic for all 
models with regression coefficient or the elasticity of 
ARPUCPPRE is –3.40 for model 1 and –3.32 for model 2. 
For both segment markets, a small price changes will 
lead to large changes in quantity. For this market, the 
demand is very sensitive to price changes. As mentioned, 
if Celcom and Digi network failed in carrying out the 
cartels or collusive arrangements, the price of network 
access will be determined by Maxis as a whole. This is 
because Maxis network is viewed as price leadership in 
the telecommunications market for cellular line because 
of its ability to control more than 40 percent of the 
telecommunications market. For example, if the Maxis 
network change the prices to a high level, all cellular 
network players will also increase the price level. 
Besides, the probability for telecommunications firms in 
Malaysia to form collusive behavior is very low. This is 
because the value of elasticity is too high, and therefore 
the telecommunications firms will not participate in 
any collusive behavior as it is more profitable. A small 
price changes can cause a higher increase in quantity 
and revenue for firms without relying on other firms. 
Meanwhile, the Maxis network is more likely to 
dominate the postpaid market share compared to Celcom 
network, which dominated the prepaid market in this 
research analysis. Between these two telecommunications 
firms, the Digi network lies in the middle between the 
postpaid markets dominated by Maxis; and the prepaid 
markets dominated by Celcom. The Digi network clearly 
adopt the principle of game theory and price leadership 
in marketing strategy and competition continue offering 
competitive price for continuance of services offered. 
However, the structure of telecommunications market 
in Malaysia is an oligopoly, hence an increase in total 
revenue for this type of market is not totally dependent on 
price changes. A more important factor for the oligopoly 
firm is non-price competition such as advertising 
campaigns to attract more number of subscriptions. 
Thus, the elasticity is very high is because the price is 
not too important and doesn’t play a dominant role in the 
oligopoly market.
The results also showed that the postpaid market is 
more elastic than prepaid market for both models. This 
is because most of the postpaid subscribers are business 
customers. Therefore, it is difficult to avoid the business 
calls and they care less about the actual price because 
the company pays the bills. The postpaid market users 
are also tied to an agreement and a contract. But for the 
prepaid market, most of the subscribers are students or the 
younger generation. These groups are more sensitive on 
the fluctuation of price and decreasing in income. Next, 
the cross-price elasticity of demand for ARPUFL is –8.00 
for model 1 and –7.32 for model 2. Lastly, the income 
elasticity is 19.4 for model 1 and 21.8 for model 2. 
THE TYPE OF GOODS
The analysis indicates that the fixed-line is complementary 
goods to the cellular phone network in Malaysia (Ahn & 
Lee 1999; Banerjee & Ros 2004; Lee & Lee 2006; Wang, 
Tang & Pan 2010) based on the negative sign obtained on 
ARPUFL  variable. If the price of fixed-line falls, people are 
willing to subscribe more of it and increase the quantity 
of demand, and at the same time they will subscribe the 
cellular phone network access irrespective of whether the 
price falls or not. This is because of the income effect 
TABLE 3. The Entity FEM Results
Variable Model 1 Model 2
D1 = Maxis α1
se(β)
t-value
-25.5
(22.739)
-1.1229
-88.4
(21.502)
-4.1132***
D2 = Celcom α2
se(β)
t-value
-31.2
(22.690)
-1.3754
-94.5
(21.438)
-4.4095***
D3 = Digi α3
se(β)
t-value
-37.7
(22.689)
-1.6614*
-101.0
(21.447)
-4.7113***
In ARPUCPPOST β1
se(β)
t-value
-4.08
(1.6743)
-2.4352***
-6.41
(1.6971)
-3.7762***
In ARPUCPPRE β2
se(β)
t-value
-3.40
 0.7604
-4.4676***
-3.32
(0.7778)
-4.2732***
In ARPUCPFL β3
se(β)
t-value
-8.00
1.1584
-6.9094***
-7.32
(1.2226)
-5.9878***
In NFL β4
se(β)
t-value
-29.6
 9.4470
-3.1327***
-
In WLFL β5
se(β)
t-value
-
 1.67
(0.6592)
 2.5406***
In GDP β6
se(β)
t-value
19.4
1.7163
11.298***
 21.8
(1.9355)
 11.308***
R2 0.9592 0.958
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and %, respectively.
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for same services but different type of services form. 
There are negative relationship between the fixed-line 
and cellular phone network access in Malaysia. 
Besides, the result also indicated that the cellular 
phone networks are luxury goods (Wang, Tang & Pan 
2010; Afridi et al., 2010) in Malaysia based on the 
positive sign obtained with high level degree of elasticity. 
But study conducted by Aguero (2008) indicated that 
the findings must be interpreted carefully because 
telecommunications cannot be treated like other luxury 
goods. For luxury goods, as people become wealthier, 
they will buy more of them and a larger percentage of 
income’s spent on these goods. In other words, as the 
total expenditure increased, more money was spent on 
telecommunications services, and greater importance in 
the budget was accorded to, indicating that telephone 
was a luxury good. 
A study by Csaba (2008) indicated that the term “new 
luxury” is used to explain the contemporary market for 
luxury. From their analysis depicts three distinct types of 
new luxury goods; accessible super-premium, old luxury 
brand extensions and mass prestige. According to this 
analysis, the super-premium have comparatively high 
price and they are accessible to a majority of consumers 
because they are relatively inexpensive and are “low-
ticket” product classes. For old luxury brand extension 
are used about lower priced models or sub-brands offered 
by established purveyors of luxury goods, which bring 
items in high ticket product categories such as prestige 
automobiles. The mass prestige goods take a middle road 
between mass and prestige, commanding a premium 
price, yet selling considerable quantities and thereby 
defying conventional wisdom about the relationship 
between price and demand, and profitability of the 
particular product markets (Csaba 2008).
THE NETWORK EFFECT
To measure the network effect, two variables were used 
as proxies such as the number of subscriber (NFL) and 
the number of waiting list for fixed-line. In this study, 
model 1 use the NFL as a proxy to measure the network 
externality. The regression coefficient of is –29.6 for 
entity FEM. The results also indicated that the network 
externality depends on the network provider’s price 
strategy and people tend to switch carrier if having any 
negative experience with network provider. Next, the 
waiting list for the fixed-line or WL is a proxy for the 
network externality in model 2. The regression coefficient 
of the WL is 1.67. The results also indicated that the 
network externality by using number of WL for fixed-line 
as a proxy has reveal the network effect or externality in 
Malaysian telecommunication sector. 
As an overall conclusion for both variables, the 
network effects play a significant role in Malaysian 
telecommunication sector. This is because the services of 
network telecommunication become more differentiated 
by increasing the value-added of services. The consumer 
utilities by subscribing the network also depend on the 
interconnection between other networks. Conversely, 
the waiting list also concluded that there are positive 
relationships with the PR but the effect of number of 
subscriber as a proxy is more dominant compared to the 
waiting list based on overall result and the significance 
through pooled OLS and FEM analysis. 
CONCLUSION
From the analysis, we found that the entity FEM is more 
preferred and appropriate model for this study compared 
to pooled OLS based on partial F-test. From the entity 
FEM analysis, all independent variables are significant. 
The price elasticity of demand for ARPUCPPOST and 
ARPUCPPRE are high elastic and significant. For this kind 
of market, the demand is very sensitive to price changes 
that occur. The ARPUCPPOST and ARPUCPPRE in Malaysia 
have negative relationship. Therefore, the probability of 
telecommunications firms in Malaysia to form collusive 
behavior is very low as it is more profitable. A small 
price changes can cause a higher increase in quantity and 
revenue for firms without relying on other firms. But the 
structure of telecommunications market in Malaysia is 
oligopoly and the price is not too important and plays a 
dominant role. Other than that, the postpaid markets are 
more elastic than prepaid markets. Most of the postpaid 
subscribers are business customer, while students or 
younger generation mostly subscribe the prepaid line. The 
ARPU for fixed-line is also significant and the cross-price 
elasticity between ARPUFL and cellular phone network 
is elastic. Thus, the fixed-line is complementary goods 
to the cellular phone network in Malaysia and has a 
negative relationship. This study also found that the 
networks externalities are strongly significant when we 
used number of subscriber (NFL) and waiting list (WL) 
as a proxy in entity FEM. The GDP per capita has a strong 
and positive relationship with the PR and high elasticity. 
The results also conclude that the cellular phone networks 
are luxury goods. 
For a small market like Malaysia, the presence of 
three major cellular phone network operators, namely 
Maxis, Celcom and Digi competing directly against one 
another has caused the existence of oligopoly market 
structures. Although the probability of the existence 
of collusive behavior and monopoly power is low, this 
should be addressed because of the development of 
telecommunications sector gadgets, particularly the 
growing use of smartphones in the market that claim the 
increasing number of subscription for cellular service 
network. Therefore, a non-price competition factors 
such as supply of service plan and smartphones package 
as a complementary goods should be introduced in the 
local market. With high income elasticity and elastic, 
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government intervention are needed to control the price 
level and tighten the conditions of service, so that the 
services provided are more affordable, high quality and 
not burden to the consumers. Lastly, the introduction 
of service tax once when the consumer decided to 
have a cellular phone network access on the prepaid 
services must be considered. This will help to control 
the increasing number of cellular phone network access 
as well as to curb the problem of having more than one 
number of cellular prepaid services. It will also take into 
account the elasticity and demographic factors of prepaid 
service subscribers. Impose a tax on prepaid services 
when the subscribers make a reload is less agreed, 
because it burdens prepaid service subscribers. 
We recommend that future studies use time series 
analysis to make a comparison with the panel data 
results as well as use individual or firm data to get 
more accurate results. We also recommend that future 
studies should expand the variable by adding a new 
variable such as advertising expenditure and non-
price competition variable. This is because Malaysia 
telecommunication sector is more on the oligopoly 
system. In additions to that for future studies, we suggest 
that the study should analyze the relationship between 
the crime rate and the cellular phone penetration rate 
in Malaysia. They should examine the relationship 
between the increasing crime rate and the ease of nest 
of access to the cellular phone network. Finally, the 
studies could be expanded by taking into account the 
existence of smartphone in the market.
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